

OUR RULE OVER JAPAN WILL BE A COMPLEX JOB

Army Will Face Conditions Entirely Different From Those in Germany

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WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 --- A period of stern but just rule under Gen. Douglas MacArthur's firm hands is in store for Japan. Yet it is believed here that in many respects, our problems in Japan are more complex than in Germany, and that, unless we know exactly what we intend to do and carry out our intentions precisely, our occupation responsibilities may be longer and more difficult than we anticipate.

It is a big job that General of the Army MacArthur, the Allied Supreme Commander in the Pacific, the man who will rule Japan's "Son of Heaven," faces. The commander's qualifications, in the opinion of many observers here, are excellent.

He knows the Japanese people, as well as the other peoples of the Far East, well; he is a strong and austere man, a proved administrator and one with enormous personal prestige in the Far East, even among the defeated enemy. The Japanese know they can expect no coddling under General MacArthur; they should know also they would not be likely to deceive him.

Ready to Balk Uprising

The sober and realistic spirit in which the United States is approaching the job of ruling Japan was reflected this week in statements from high military leaders.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, in warning that we will have to keep a large army in the Far East for some time, declared that until we had determined that "no new treachery is being planned" by any Japanese groups, we must have the means "to stamp out inexorably and completely any uprising."

Gen. Brehon B. Somervell also warned that "we must be prepared for sporadic resistance from fanatical leaders and troops." It is quite evident that we intend to take nothing on good faith in dealing with the perpetrators of Pearl Harbor.

The size of the occupation forces still is a closely guarded military secret, but there are indications that it will be sizable.

Mr. Stimson estimated that the Japanese had 2,250,000 trained and armed soldiers in the home islands alone, and an equal number on the mainland and throughout the Pacific. At the present time, we have approximately 1,800,000 troops in the Pacific theatre and Far East.

These troops, coupled with the manpower of the Russians and the Chinese in Manchuria and China, and the British, Indian, Australian, and New Zealand troops in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, are certainly adequate to do the job of disarming the Japanese and henceforth keeping order in the Orient.

There is almost certain to be some sporadic fighting, and perhaps some more American lives lost, as we clean out the fanatics, not all of whom may hear or recognize their Emperor's surrender message in

the hills and caves of many of the captured and bypassed islands.

"FOR HIS OWN GOOD"



Once the teeth of the Japanese Army have been drawn, we can cut down the size of the occupation forces. The Russians, who certainly are going to get some Asiatic territory out of the Japanese surrender, can be counted on to restore order in Manchuria.

The Chinese should be able to do the job wholly in their country, though they may need help in the beginning.

Our job is going to be on the main Japanese islands, probably (as General Somervell indicated) on Formosa and some parts of the Asiatic mainland. And in the permanent garrisoning of the many bases ringing Japan, which we are expected to keep for our future security.

Needed Troops to Be Sent

At least 1,500,000 of the 1,800,000 men now in the Pacific and Far East will be returned to the United States by next June 30, but new troops-in as great numbers as the military authorities decide are necessary-will go out to replace them.

We plan eventually to rule our zone of occupation in Germany with 400,000 men; it would not be surprising if more troops were needed in Japan.

There are great differences between the jobs in Germany and Japan. In the shattered ruins of the Reich, we took over from a thoroughly beaten Army; in the land of the Rising Sun, we will take over from an Army that we never met in force.

Although the Japanese Army laid down its arms because its leaders knew their cause was thoroughly hopeless, there is a great psychological difference. Experts here are firmly convinced we shall have to impress upon the Japanese that they were beaten, else there will be the makings for a renaissance of military spirit such as activated Germany in the years between her two defeats.

On this very question of the Japanese attitude, experts on Japanese psychology are far from happy over the broadcasts by a Tokyo spokesman identified as one Kusuo Oya, even after Emperor Hirohito's surrender. Among other things this person said:

"*** in spiritual power we have not lost yet. We do not think the way we have thought has been wrong. Of course, we do not say that we were right in everything. *** We have lost, but this is temporary."

It will become most important, some authorities consider, to straighten out Japanese thinking on such points. Since the Japanese mind is not easy to tamper with, this is a job that will call for the most skillful type of planning and execution---a sort of program of psychological post-warfare.

It remains to be seen how skillfully we can do it. The success of our past excursions into psychological warfare fields has been, with some exceptions, a controversial subject.

The physical condition in which we will find Japan is another factor that alters the comparison with Germany. Although Japan took severe damage from our air forces, the aerial campaign against her was so relatively young that a greater proportion of the country is unscathed.

Nevertheless, we must rebuild certain ports, docks, bridges, railroads, motor roads and utility systems for the benefit of our occupation forces which will need them.

In Germany we found the war industry pretty thoroughly smashed up as a result of the long air campaign. In Japan a greater proportion will be found intact.

In the Potsdam declaration the United States, Britain and China declared that the war-making power of Japan shall be destroyed. The dismantling of her industry alone will be a gigantic job.

Authorities familiar with Japan point out, incidentally, that it is perfectly feasible to establish her as a self-sustaining nation, even after she has been deprived of the heavy industry formerly used to build up her potential for waging war. They do not anticipate a disastrous economic problem as a result of the forthcoming industrial amputations.

War Trials a Problem

The problem of bringing Japan's war criminals to justice also looms large. The Potsdam declaration promised the world that "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

Thus far it has not been disclosed whether President Truman would appoint a war crimes prosecutor who would fill a role in Japan similar to that occupied in Germany by Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, or whether he would leave the prosecution duties to General MacArthur.

In a military sense-the Army and the Navy, which also expects to participate in occupation and garrison duties-is prepared for the physical job of occupying Japan. The unexpectedly swift capitulation, before actual invasion, presents to us some problems of bringing up troops and equipment, but, on the whole, the armed forces probably are in better position for the occupation job than if they had to invade the country first.

On the administrative side, the quick surrender may have been a little embarrassing. The Army's Civil Affairs Schools were training specialists for the Japanese theatre rapidly, but the job will require several thousands more than have been trained.

The War Department is considering means of stepping up this training rapidly, but the results, particularly in view of the complexity of Japanese background and language are bound to be somewhat sketchy.

High War Department sources have pointed out that our rule of Japan will differ radically from the German occupation in that the Government of Emperor Hirohito will remain in existence, whereas in Germany the occupying military authorities are supreme.

Using the Emperor

This does not mean that the Emperor can "cross" General MacArthur, but the Emperor's Government actually will be used as a means of restoring peace and re-establishing orderly procedure.

After the military influence has been purged from the Government, existing Japanese civilian agencies probably will be permitted to resume their normal functions as usual under general supervision of the occupying forces.

There is considerable Washington interest in the question of Emperor Hirohito's ultimate future. This, of course, is a purely speculative matter, but informed opinion here seems to think that the little Emperor can survive so long as (a) the Japanese people continue to want him; and (b) his intentions and actions are sincere and effective. Failure to cooperate, it is generally believed, would spell the end of the ruler.

Authorities on Japan here are not too discouraged on the prospects of ultimate cooperation from the Japanese people. Though they feel there is ground for treachery in the beginning unless we stamp out militaristic and subversive influences, they also feel that the proper sort of educational and administrative program, carried out over a reasonably lengthy period, will produce results.

Japan never will become an American style democracy, but her trouble-making proclivities at least can be curbed.

They feel that much depends on the carrying out of such a program, for an occupation army alone cannot win the peace, unless it is prepared to occupy the enemy's homeland forever.